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Early Learnings from the Oil Spill Crisis

Clearly, we will be reviewing the chain of events, doing post mortems, and second guessing for a long time to come all the events before during, and after the oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico. There will be many points of view and they will differ greatly based upon your perspective. Corporations’ views will differ from environmentalists, lawyers’ will differ from engineers. And Gulf States inhabitants may have very different views than those from the Beltway in Washington D.C.

One area of focus will undoubtedly be whether we used all the tools at our disposal to respond to the crisis quickly and effectively. One might ask “Why wouldn’t we?” In reality, the discussion needs to be “What prevented us from doing so?”

More to come in later blog posts, but for now I thought it would be an opportune time to share some early reflections related to this oil crisis on this topic from my point of view. In particular, as we worked to energize problem solvers from all over the world to drive solutions for BP and the oil spill cleanup efforts, we and the world more broadly found it very difficult to pierce the corporate veil at BP to provide assistance. Even when BP provided vehicles for suggestions to be considered, it was clear that this was not a primary strategy. Most were not process, and frankly, the world was never given the transparency or tools by BP to fully participate in the process in the first place. Why was this so difficult and what can we learn?

Top of mind for me:

1) Crisis Situations are Inherently Chaotic: Add into that the political, governance, legal and PR issues when crisis is centered around a huge public multinational corporation and it gets worse. This leads to the bunker mentality which has dominated much of this crisis. Government and organizations will need to examine their policies, SOPs, etc. to ensure they don’t actually limit the ability to respond in emergency situations. Policies should encourage quick and decisive use of open collaboration in crisis situations and disincent those that fail to use every avenue at their disposal.

2) We need to Overcome NIH: Open collaborative behavior is foreign to most organizations. They don’t have the frame of experience to justify the cycles needed to make work or to invest. Early on, I am convinced that BP accepted ideas only because public relations demanded it. I suspect they may now see open collaboration as a potential first response strategy to actually deal with crisis situations. Interestingly, other oil companies and organization in other industries have now asked us to share our experience and solutions (not yet BP though). This whole experience has the potential to change the landscape. I believe many organizations had a collective epiphany (Could have been us! What can we do to be ready?) these past 3 months. The world may well learn from this tragedy.

3) We need to “Pre” Wire Open Networks and Emergency Responders: This situation has laid bare an enormous need to follow through with the public-private partnership “pre” wiring we’ve discussed for more than a year. The wrong time to work out who can partner effectively to make a difference is DURING the crisis. Government must take a lead here in permissioning and directing parties to this end. What WAS proven in this crisis is that colossal problems demand a global response, that the collective WE are up to the task, and that our systems don’t currently support a global “on demand” response.

One lesson learned here is that some problems are too big to leave solely to the “experts” on the ground. And humans are more than capable of self organizing and directing their creativity, inventiveness, and ingenuity in situations like these, particularly when directed openly and transparently by the parties on the ground.

We need to work now to improve readiness the next time. And there is always a next time.

What do you think?

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  • Charles Warner

    There is a major conflict within your concepts. You do point out that a time of crisis, such as the Gulf oil spill, 9/11 or the aftermath of Katrina, Chaos rules, and those responsible develop a “bunker attitude”. This is not the appropriate time to flood those responsible with unproven suggestions, because reviewing and analyzing the suggestions for valid approaches and replying to the submitters takes time away from the primary goal of solving the problem. From the limited exposure I have had to suggestions for a solution, it is very obvious to me that the flood of suggestions included way too many from those who had no comprehension of the constraints against which the responsible parties had to work, nor an understanding of what the reality of the situation was. While I agree that “Policies should encourage quick and decisive use of open collaboration in crisis situations and disincent those that fail to use every avenue at their disposal,” I do not believe that involving lawyers and movie stars is very likely to result in a viable engineering solution…
    Imagine if you can, how much worse the situation would have been had BP decided to wait until Innocentive finished their study before attempting solutions…
    I agree whole-heartedly that “pre-wiring” a process to address crises is a good idea, but it is very difficult to plan for events that have never occurred before (how does one plan an appropriate response to something like 9/11?). The Gulf spill was not unprecendented, but the Mexican Gulf spill of a few years ago did not garner sufficient media attention to result in an improved response regime. In fact, it is unlikely that lessons learned from that event would be directly applicable to the more recent event, because the conditions surrounding the events were too different. When pushing the edge, traditional approaches may not work…
    I do not believe that putting the Government in charge is going to solve the problem. The government has a very poor record with regards to responding to emergencies in recent years.

  • Paul Wallis

    The problem is understanding what Innocentive is, and what it does.

    As someone who’s worked in government, may I say that one of the problems is that comprehension at the administrative level tends to be generational. Innocentive is unique, it’s not in the seminars from 1980, they didn’t do “rapid response” in college, and worse, it’s unprecedented. Innocentive needs to be hardwired into consciousness as a working option. They need to know what it is, how it works, and which statutes they can use as a pillow while working with it.

    Business is much the same, if easier in terms of the Innocentive client base and related industries, who’ve actually read a newspaper since 1990. This is the likely response at any level below someone who actually owns a company or a CEO who’s got a grip on the physical management of a situation:

    “Now… You say you’re an organization that solves industrial problems…? Er, what exactly do you do..? I see… how do you do it…?” It could take years.

    The result, if any, will be a report to management about a crisis management option, duly noted and duly ignored.

    You’re not dealing with Mensa, you’re dealing with people whose horizons stretch as far as their spreadsheets, and they usually don’t understand them, either, just the figures. BP is a classic case. The oil industry, like so many others, is insular, immune to criticism of any kind, and if they want to ignore something, the result is a PR formula.

    The PR process is far more obstacle than asset, unless it’s able to comprehend the value of obvious results and something to put in the press releases. To register on PR radar requires high profile and some practice spelling the name. This is a mindset which may or may not find it expedient to consider the sky blue. The name of the game is selective information.

    To get around this pervasive sitcom situation, Innocentive needs to network, talk direct to CEOs and industry leaders actually able to comprehend the value of hundreds of thousands of motivated people working on problems.

    Innocentive produced from memory 908 responses where BP produced a handful in practice, most of which didn’t work. The qualitative efficiency, speed and depth of response are the selling points to industries and their movers and shakers. “We’re faster, we provide more options, we’re motivated, and we can prove it,” are the irrefutable points.

    The business and government spheres are retro by definition, and take the easy options wherever possible. To move them forward requires some very patient spadework. The rule of thumb is if you have to talk baby talk to get any understanding, talk to someone else.

  • Scott Bergquist

    In response to Charles Warner, I suggest there is an inherent contradiction in his commentary. If Innocentive did provide 908 responses, but many were created with no concept of the difficulties or realities of the situation, Charles Warner seemed to be able to categorize and cast aside those “movie star” proposals at a speedy rate, leaving only the core proposals with engineering merit. There are engineers within the Innocentive solver network with vast expertise, yet Mr. Warner collectively lumps them with the movie stars right out of hand, with no measure of their submitted work. I worked at Chevron for eleven years, including two in Corporate Engineering, and I know how difficult it is for large groups even within the company to coordinate and fruitfully share ideas, much less act upon mere observations from outside. I also worked on a J Ray McDermott derrick barge in 1976, and I know that the quality and outlook of key managers make all the difference in how problems are addressed and solved. The government is not the problem, unless you prima facie regard them as a “problem and nothing but…”

  • Gerald Campbell, Ph.D.

    In your editorial you stated that some problems are too big to be left to the experts on the ground. In this case that did not happen – the experts on the ground were systematically kept from implementing any potential solution by a federal government that still seems bent on making the problem as bad as possible.

    I was the lead scientist in an industry coalition of bioremediation and engineering firms, most members of which were known to Adm. Landry (ret.) when whe took command of the incident. In this capacity she offered the full cooperation of the USCG; we also had cooperation from NOAA and Port Fourchon authorities. This cooperation included access to the USCG laboratories at Port Fourchon.

    Right up until the local leader of this coalition was touring the lab, everything was positive. Then came a phone call; immediately after this the tour was interrupted and everyone from the coalition was escorted off the premeses. Another individual was kept from supplying samples of the oil that was then starting to wash up on the beaches on the USCG/Port Fourchon Police compound.

    Later that week the USCG seized samples from the first oil plume spreading into the eddy current; their stated rationale was that they were “evidence from a crime scene.” Right – a crime scene that BP supertankers can churn through any time they want, and that BP (the only logical “suspect” possible in this case) controlled access to.

    It was shortly after this that Adm. Landry announced her “long-planned” retirement, which had somehow never been mentioned and was apparently not considered when she was first put in command. I would note here that Adm. Landry was not only familiar with, but had commanded cleanup in a large-scale spill near the Mass. coast.

    The obstruction continued, with the USCG blocking access to surface vessels not authorized by BP. Early on, local police blocking were access to vantage points, and the FAA banning plane flights over the spill area (there was “too much traffic” in the area – after all, a BP commercial has bragged that it puts “over 50″ aircraft into the air every day, in a spill area that extended over 3000 sq. mi. and thousands of feet in altitude).

    Two days after LA Gov. Jindal had his famous “there is oil in the wetlands” press conference near Venice, the USCG had armed personnel aboard BP boats, blocking access to the area on the grounds that the air was hazardous in the area (but apparently not hazardous for the government to institute an evacuation of people living there 24 hr a day.) The EPA declared sole authority over all coastlands when LA parishes started planning their own cleanup tests, and did not permit any cleanup attempts, even on private land. The USCG later seized skimmers that Gov. Jindal had hired to clear coastal waterways, alleging that they needed inspection, even though their inspection certificates were up to date (they were kept from working for more than a day.) The Army Corps of Engineers delayed ruling on a request for a permit for sand berm construction to prevent the contamination of more wetlands for two weeks, by which time many of those wetlands had already been contaminated; even then they did not grant many of them.

    With the appointment of Adm. Thad Allen as incident commander, the focus of the USCG shifted 180 degrees, from studying the spill with an eye toward instituting cleanup measures and limiting damage, to providing Bp with assistance in keeping information of specifics secret and having the stated goal (listen to Adm. Allen’s own words in the press conferences around then) of trying to get the well “producing” again.

    [Those incidents which I did not personally witness were relayed to me by my business partners or reported in the press.]

    I believe that the only way the federal government’s response to this spill can be understood is to think of it in purely political terms. BP is a large Obama contributor and therefore politically favored; on the other hand the administration has a stated goal of reducing oil consumption. These two points of view (even though they are contradictory in a lot of instances) command the response, instead of any desire to prevent lasting damage to the Gulf Coast and the livelihoods of those living there. For example:

    The Pres. has stated again and again that he will punish BP, that he will “kick it’s ass.” And yet no fines are levied; no restrictions or oversight applied to BP as might befit a company that routinely shortcuts safety to further profit. Instead the Pres. attempted to institute a complete ban of oil drilling at any depth over 500 ft. – a level at which relatively easy access by submersibles is possible and underwater habitats allow divers to work. After the declared ban was struck down as being overly broad, the administration enacted a virtual ban by refusing to consider any new pernits, even those by responsible companies instead of industry bad boy BP.

    The appointed commission to study the spill is constituted of committed environmentalists. The Dept. of the Interior is led by another committed environmentalist, who is willing to ignore the law and the Supreme Court to further his “green” ends, which seem to be summed up (as far as permits go) by the Nancy Reagan philosophy: “just say no.”

    During this whole period, the federal government has deliberately placed obstacles in the way of one way that the oil could be attacked starting as it left the wellhead – the use of anaerobic Archaea that will degrade the carbon compounds in the oil, while simultaneously putting oxygen (liberated by the reduction of sulfates) into the biosphere. In combination with other technologies available to us, these Archaea could protect coastlines; degrade floating slicks without depleting oxygen in the waters below; and be delivered to the wetlands bottom or sea floor to degrade the oil/dispersant that has sunk there instead of letting it continue to poison the crawfish and shellfish that many LA residents rely on for their living.

    In place of effective solutions we have booms, which are guaranteed to fail with most of the oil kept below the surface by the dispersant; local ship captains hired by BP sitting idle (while those who want to help the cleanup cannot find surface craft or have to pay double the usual rate); Kevin Costner and his centrifuges, which (if you make all of the assumptions the best caswe) will take over 300 years to clean up the spill; and unemployed locals (if they pass the political smell test) picking up blobs of oil from the beach, leaving literally tons more under the sand. It is truly sad that a disaster of this magnitude should be allowed to destroy such a huge amount of sea life, coastlines and livelihoods, for political expediency.

  • http://www.imp.mx Alfredo M. Claussen

    Just another kind of reflection: In a medical emergency, frecuently the most important thing to determine is what should NOT be done. People trying to help by providing “solutions” without enough information and/or enough experience in the field, will frecuently propose ideas that just will not work.

    But in this situation few (or very few) people proceeded to analyze what would not work at all. This is important because a lot of effort and money, and specially a precious time were wasted in a series of completely futile attempts to do “anything”, instead of concentrating on good engineering approaches.

    The rubber tire and thrash injection, for example, was a complete failure since the beginning. To see a supposedly “experienced team” of so called “experts” conducting such an ignorant attempt only highlights the kind of bizarre decisions taken by the people in charge.

    One thing is clear; the business model where a company buys a Block of underwater terrain to drill in deepwater, and then contracts the operation to a second company that owns a floating platform, which crew of around 125 people is hired differently on every job (almost as in an improvised fishing vessel-not offending fishermen of course); and then the critical cementing operation on a difficult well is assigned to a THIRD contractor, which decides to use a product that is not used for the majority of those jobs, while being “supervised” by ONLY SIX persons of the Oil Company is a sure recipe for problems. Specially when the platform is working at a fast pace to be mobilized to another location “as soon as possible”…

    Then, why wasn’t the Methane Hydrates Plugging considered by the “experts” designing the first collection device?

    Why were the risk of producing additional leaks by “capping the well” ignored? Why reliable information was NOT passed by the company responsible for this mess, so that real experts in other companies could help?

    In our experience in the Mexico’s “Ixtoc-1″ well blowout many years ago, we already knew that if tons of heavy lead balls (with a thick one yard long canvas cone attached, called “comets”) injected thru the wellhead, were violently thrown out of the water; the rubber tire pieces were a sad joke.

    But several bad experiences teached us that private companies are not to be trusted when drilling in offshore locations with too loose supervision, simply because they always put earnings above safety (at least in PEMEX experiences, ALMOST ALL of our well accidents have happened when a private company was involved).

    This “outsourcing” madness is depleting previously prestigious companies of truly organized and capable people inside the company, and that needs to be considered. In deepwater drilling and production, only Physics and true Engineering matter, not politics and economics. The risks are there and the results are evident.